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ABSTRACT
Once relegated to the domains of science fiction, modern day scientists
and researchers are poised on the precipice of making genome editing
clinically available. Once introduced into a clinical setting the effects of
an off-target mutation or germline edit will remain largely unknown until
health issues arise later in life or in the following generation. The novelty
of the injuries that will arise require a system that is able to balance the
interests of physicians with single and multi-generational plaintiffs, while
providing a realistic framework for courts to follow. This comment offers
a brand-new context that accounts for these needs and sets expectations
for how to handle these injuries in the right way, promulgating the goals
of tort law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you and your spouse have always wanted to have children together.
It is important to both of you that your children be genetically related;
however, your brother has Hunter’s Syndrome making you a carrier of the
disease.1 If the choice is between a genetic child with Hunter’s Syndrome
and adopting, you would rather adopt. Luckily, you are aware that CRISPR/
Cas-9 is now being offered on a clinical basis.2 This technique enables
doctors to edit out certain genes from your child’s genetic makeup so that
they are born with, or without, certain features including genetic diseases
like Hunter’s Syndrome. You and your husband go to a nearby clinic and
are reassured by the doctor you will have a healthy child, free from genetic
defects.3 Feeling reassured, you pay for the genome editing and undergo the
litany of tests, invasive surgeries and steroids4 in order to conceive your
child. Nine months later, your doctor hands the two of you your son, and
everything is perfect for two years until you begin noticing developmental
1. Hunter’s Syndrome is a rare genetic disorder caused by a missing enzyme. The
missing enzyme causes the body to be unable to breakdown certain molecules leading to
molecular build up, which impairs development, organ function and physical abilities.
Hunter’s Syndrome is hereditary and is passed down from the mother’s genetic makeup.
The disease is quite painful and requires lifelong care. See Hunter Syndrome - Symptoms and
Causes, MAYO CLINIC (2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/hunter-syndrome/
diagnosis-treatment/diagnosis/dxc-20165681 [https://perma.cc/ 329K-N6FZ] (last visited
Jan. 21, 2018) .
2. CRISPR/Cas-9 technology is not yet at this stage, but it is only a matter of time,
as is discussed later in this comment.
3. This hypothetical is loosely based on the seminal Israeli case CA 518/82 Zeitzov v.
Katz 40(2) PD 85 (1986) (Isr.).
4. Steve. P. Calandrillo & Chryssa V. Deliganis, In Vitro Fertilization and The Law:
How Legal and Regulatory Neglect Compromised a Medical Breakthrough, 57 ARIZ. L.
REV. 311, 314–20 (2015).
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abnormalities in your child.5 You and your spouse take your child to his
pediatrician’s office and are referred to a specialist. After numerous tests
you learn that the genome editing you paid for was performed improperly
—your child has Hunter’s Syndrome. He inherited the disease from you
as a result of the doctor’s negligence.
In a different scenario, imagine you are the mom of three young boys.
Due to developmental delays, the doctor suspects that your eldest son has
muscular dystrophy. You consent to the blood test necessary to confirm
the diagnosis,6 and the results come back positive for Duchenne Muscular
Dystrophy (“DMD”).7 Boys who suffer from DMD quickly become wheelchair
bound,8 require ventilators,9 and die before the age of thirty.10 The doctor
informs you that there is a genetic component to DMD;11 therefore, there
is the potential that the mutation exists in your other two sons as well.12
You have your younger two sons tested and both tests come back positive.
You are now faced with the prospect of watching your children die slowly
5. Hunter’s Syndrome typically effects males who begin to show symptoms between
eighteen-months and two-years of age. Often the initial symptoms are a noticeable regression
in motor skills or fine movements. Recognizable symptoms include changes in facial features,
the cessation of speech and regression from walking to crawling. Hunter Syndrome - Symptoms
and Causes, supra note 1, at 2.
6. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF CHILD HEALTH & HUM. DEVELOPMENT, How is Muscular
Dystrophy Diagnosed?, https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/musculardys/condition
info/pages/diagnosed.aspx [https://perma.cc/GHX4-58FG] (last updated Dec. 1, 2016).
7. DMD is a form of muscular dystrophy that effects one in thirty-six hundred
boys and leads to progressive weakening and degeneration of the bodies muscles. DMD
effects most muscles within the body by the time the child reaches their late teenage years,
including the muscles that control the lungs and heart. Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy,
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/duchenne-muscular-dystrophy/
overview.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). See also Alan E.H. Emery, The muscular dystrophies,
359 LANCET 687, 687–95 (2002).
8. Moser, H., Duchenne muscular dystrophy: pathogenetic aspects and genetic
prevention, HUM. GENET. 66, 17–40 (1984).
9. Id.
10. Hoffman et al., Dystrophin: the protein product of the Duchenne muscular
dystrophy locus, 51 CELL 919, 919 (1987). In general, patients with DMD tend to become
wheelchair bound between the ages of 8 to 10, and usually die around the age of 20. Id.
11. DMD is an X-linked recessive disorder that primarily affects boys. They inherit
the mutation from their mother who is a carrier of the DMD gene. Duchenne and Becker
Muscular Dystrophy, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/
duchenne-and-becker-muscular-dystrophy#inheritance [http://perma.cc/WV8Q-KZVW]
(last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
12. This hypothetical is loosely based on the experiences of Betty Vertin. See Betty
Vertin, My Family’s Journey with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, E PARENT MAGAZINE,
2016.
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and painfully over time. However, CRISPR/Cas-9 offers some relief.13
In this context, rather than modifying the genome before pregnancy,
CRISPR/Cas-914 allows doctors to repair the mutation of the dystrophin
gene.15 This is a one-time procedure that is relatively non-invasive.16 The
treatment is not a cure-all and those with DMD will still experience some
symptoms, though they are much less severe17 and make the genetic mutation
nonfatal.18 Regardless, your family decides to proceed with the treatment
and is initially thrilled by the results. However, a few years later your
middle child begins showing more severe symptoms eventually requiring
the use of a wheelchair. When you go back to the doctor, you discover the
doctor failed to properly edit the dystrophin gene in the muscle stem cells.19
As time passed, the therapeutic effects of the CRISPR/Cas-9 treatment
faded.20
The doctor is unable to tell you whether the progression can be stopped.
Regardless, the damage already been done is irreversible. Two possible
scenarios position themselves. Either the doctor attempts to remedy his
mistake, fails, and your son dies from DMD despite your efforts. Or the
doctor remedies his mistake and slows the progress, but your son remains
wheelchair bound for the remainder of his life. As for the other two sons,
the parents are left hopeless and watch anxiously to see signs that their
treatments have also failed.
In one final scenario, imagine parents are aware of a genetic history of
hemophilia in their family. Before having their own children, they enlist

13. Charis L. Himeda et al., Scalpel or Straitjacket: CRISPR/Cas9 Approaches for
Muscular Dystrophies, 37 TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCIENCES 249, 249 (2016) (There are
currently no successful, long-term treatments for DMD though CRISPR/Cas-9 have shown
promising results.)
14. In combination with induced pluripotent stem cells. Hongmei Lisa Li et. al.,
Precise Correction of the Dystrophin Gene in Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy Patient
Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells by TALEN and CRISPR-Cas9, 4 STEM CELL REPORTS 143–
54 (2015).
15. Id. at 143.
16. Himeda, supra note 13, at 250.
17. Id. at 249.
18. Id. This hypothetical assumes that these experiments, though currently successful
in mice and monkeys, survives the human trial phase of testing. The younger the age of
the individual being treated, the milder the form of DMD should be. As a result, in this
hypothetical these boys should only manifest a mild form of the disorder. See also Antonio
Regalado, Can CRISPR Save Ben Dupree?, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.
technologyreview.com/s/602491/can-crispr-save-ben-dupree/ [https://perma.cc/DS74-PZST].
19. This is necessary for the body to maintain dystrophin production. Jocelyn
Kaiser, CRISPR Helps Heal Mice With Muscular Dystrophy, SCIENCE (Dec. 31, 2015, 2:00
PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/12/crispr-helps-heal-mice-muscular- [https://perma.
cc/NX47-N2YU].
20. Id.
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the help of a physician who will perform CRISPR/Cas-9 on their zygotes21
prior to implantation of a fertile egg to avoid passing the disorder on to
future generations.22 Nine months later, they have a beautiful girl! As
a female, it is unlikely that the X-chromosome linked genetic disorder will
exhibit any symptoms,23 but she might be a carrier24 and without genome
editing, the disorder has a 50% chance of manifesting in any sons she may
have.25 For personal reasons, her parents never disclose to her that she is
a CRISPR/Cas-9 baby. She is completely unaware hemophilia was ever
once a part of her genetic makeup growing up. Fast forward to adulthood;
she gives birth to a baby boy, but before leaving the hospital, the doctors
perform a routine circumcision; except her son will not stop bleeding.26
The doctors use supplementary coagulation therapy,27 take a small blood
sample, and test him for hemophilia.28 The test results come back positive.
The news is devastating; this means an entirely different life other than
imagined for the son.29 The doctors ask the parents if they or their families

21. Merriam Webster defines a zygote as “a cell formed by the union of two gametes.”
Zygote, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/zygote [http://perma.
cc.K56X-94U8] (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
22. About 80% of all cases of hemophilia have an identifiable history of the disease.
Leon L. Bram & Norma H. Dickey, FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2016).
23. Id.
24. Potential carriers are women whose carrier status cannot be clearly defined from
the pattern of inheritance but have a maternal hemophilic relative. Additional testing can
be performed to ascertain the certainty of the carrier status, but one must be aware that
testing is necessary, i.e. that there is a family history of hemophilia. See generally Riva Miller,
Counselling about Diagnosis and Inheritance of Genetic Bleeding Disorders: Haemophilia A
and B, 5 HAEMOPHILIA 77, 78 (1999).
25. See Heredity of Hemophilia, CAN. HEMOPHILIA SOC’Y, http://www.hemophilia.
ca/en/bleeding-disorders/hemophilia-a-and-b/heredity-of-hemophilia/ [https://perma.cc/T39QAZRQ] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
26. Diagnosis, CENT. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
ncbddd/c.
27. See Hassan Mansouritorghabeh et. al., Circumcision in Males with Bleeding
Disorders, 5 MEDITERR. J. HEMATOL. INFECT. DIS. (2013). Supplementary coagulation
therapy is designed to cut off the blood supply to a certain area as the patient is unable to
stop bleeding when they suffer from hemophilia. See Mathews V. et al., Surgery for hemophilia
in developing countries, 31 SEMINARS IN THROMBBOSIS & HEMOSTASIS. 538, 43 (2005).
28.
To test for hemophilia A or B in a child, a physician takes a blood sample and
measures the amount of factor VIII and IX in the blood. Miller, supra note 24, at 78–79.
29. Prevention of trauma is particularly important for children with hemophilia, this
requires children to abstain from or be particularly careful during certain normal childhood
activities, such as when on the playground. See generally Wagnalls, supra note 22.
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have a history of hemophilia; it is emphatically denied. Upon hearing this,
her parents, wracked with guilt, confess they had their daughter’s genome
edited before birth in the hope of avoiding this exact situation.30 Unfortunately,
now not only is the daughter dealing with the news and effects of the
improper genome editing, but so is your son—and the physician? He died
five years ago and will never know how he injured your family. Therefore,
in these circumstances, the question turns on who will be held liable for a
devastating and pervasive injury.
II. CRISPR/CAS-9 MEDIATED GENOME EDITING
Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat Associated
System (“CRISPR/Cas-9”) is widely used as a gene editing tool for model
systems in animals and humans. The technology is used to modify the genome
of animals and humans in a lab setting with the objective of implementing
modifications in living species.31 CRISPR/Cas-9 is appealing to researchers
because it is faster, more efficient, and cheaper than prior gene editing
techniques32 and has the potential for a wide range of applications.33 The
technique allows researchers to edit parts of the genome by cleaving or
adding in DNA sequences using the Cas-9 enzyme.34 A piece of ribonucleic
acid acts as a guide (“gRNA”), allowing the DNA edit to target the proper
sequence and bind to it.35 The gRNA is designed to target and edit a specific
sequence of the genome. However, it is still common for non-target mutations
to occur.36 Mutations can lead the gene to either not function at all or
function improperly.37
30. There are currently no cures for hemophilia, only treatments which often have
adverse side effects. Miller, supra note 24, at 78.
31. The technology has already been used to modify the genomes of live birth monkeys
but has not yet resulted in live birth humans. See generally Helen Shen, First Monkeys
with Customized Mutations Born, Nature, https://www.nature.com/news/first-monkeyswith-customized- mutations-born-1.14611 (last visited Jan. 30, 2018, 1:20 PM).
32. Unlike earlier techniques, CRISP/Cas-9 utilizes the Cas-9 protein to guide
bacteria and archaea to attack invading, or undesired, DNA. See Aparna Vidyasagar, What
is CRISPR?, LIVE SCIENCE (Apr. 21, 2017, 9:47 PM), http://www.livescience.com/58790crispr-explained.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). This natural defense mechanism allows
scientists to more specifically target DNA edits. Id.
33. Martina Baumann, CRISPR/CAS9 Genome Editing—New and Old Ethical Issues
Arising From a Revolutionary Technology, 10 NANOETHICS 139, 139–42 (2016).
34. The Cas-9 enzyme works similarly to a copy and paste tool, in that it allows
that portion of the genome to be removed or added to. See id. at 139.
35. Liang P. et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear
Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN CELL 363, 364–70 (2015). This entire article as a whole provides in
depth details and explanation of gRNA participation in CRISPR.
36. Id. at 364.
37. Alex Reis & Breton Hornblower, CRISPR/Cas-9 and Targeted Genome Editing: A
New Era in Molecular Biology, 1 NEB EXPRESSIONS 1, 1–5 (2014).
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The pace at which In-Vitro Fertilization (“IVF”) techniques have advanced,
from being previously controversial to now becoming widely utilized,
serves as a counter to critics who argue that widespread clinical application
of CRISPR/Cas-9 in the near future is unlikely.38 IVF faced many of the
same criticisms that CRISPR/Cas-9 does in the present: concerns about
long-term effects, ethical considerations, and a general governmental ban
on funding.39 Yet after the first IVF birth occurred,40 private funding began
pouring in for IVF treatment research. In following this chain of events,
it is likely that once the first live human birth results from a CRISPR/Cas9 procedure,41 the desire for a more idealized form of procreation will
subsume the current concerns.42 New CRISPR/Cas-9 techniques may very
well also enter the market with few or no pre-market and longitudinal tests
performed, much like with IVF.43
In absence of certain studies, the continued effects of CRISPR/Cas-9
will be discovered as time unfolds. The effects of an off-target mutation
or germline edits will remain largely unknown until health issues arise
later in life or in the following generation. Situations similar to the

38. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF CHILD HEALTH, supra note 6. See also Powledge TB
(2014) Whole-Genome Sequencing in Your Doctor’s Office? A Reality Check, but Sooner
than Later, http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2014/03/25/whole-genome-sequencing-inyour-doctors-office-a-reality-check-but-sooner-than-later/ [https://perma.cc/K4FG-SKFV]
(last visited Oct. 4, 2016); Qiantao Zheng et al., Reconstitution of UCP1 using CRISPR/
Cas9 in the white adipose tissue of pigs decreases fat deposition and improves thermogenic
capacity, 114 PNAS 9474, 9475–79 (2017).
39. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF CHILD HEALTH, supra note 6.
40. Adam Eley, How Has IVF Developed Since The First ‘Test-Tube Baby’? (July
23, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-33599353 [https://perma.cc/2NWQ-8E8N].
41. Despite currently low success rates researchers find the technology remains
viable. This may not be surprising given that the current success rates of human embryonic
CRISPR/Cas-9 testing are reflective of initial success rates found with in vitro fertilization.
Daniel Cressey et al., UK Scientists Apply for License to Edit Genes in Human Embryos,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/scientistsapply-for-license-to-edit-genes-in-human-embryos [https://perma.cc/WM4H-YPXR].
Author’s Note: the research cited is that of IVF treatments. I use this research to analogize to
IVF treatments. CRISPR is new technology and under intense research and experimentation.
There is little to no case studies that would apply directly to CRIPR procedures.
42. Live births have already occurred in the cynomolgus monkey tests and have been
quite successful, with the resulting infants developing normally. Niu Y. et al., Generation
of Gene-Modified Cynomolgus Monkey via Cas9/RNA-Mediated Gene Targeting in OneCell Embryos, 156 CELL 836, 839 (2014).
43. M.De Rycke et al., Epigenetic Risks Related to Assisted Reproductive Technologies,
17(10) HUM. REPROD. 2487, 2488 (2002).
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hypotheticals raised above in this Comment’s introduction will inevitably
arise, bringing questions tort law is unprepared to handle.
A plaintiff must prove four elements under the traditional concept of
tort law: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant
breached their duty with regard to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant’s breach
caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the plaintiff suffered injury or harm.44
Additionally, the underlying policy goals of tort law are fairness and
deterrence;45 thus, damages are awarded based on the loss the injured
party suffered.46 However, the traditional concept of tort law takes an allor-nothing approach, allocating damages only when the injury suffered is
both detrimental and physical.47 Accordingly, this approach is insufficient
for torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9.
The subjective nature of torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9 pose significant
uncertainties that do not exist in other areas of tort law. The elements of
the traditional tort law case leave out a few considerations. Such considerations
include; (1) when does the cause of action arise?; (2) does it arise when
the effects of unsuccessful gene editing manifest or before?; (3) can the
injury date back to when the CRISPAR/Cas-9 procedure occurred?; (4)
how will damages be assessed?; and (5) what types of remedies will be accessible
as a result of a lawsuit? These are just a few questions to consider, some
of many, and these questions can only go unanswered for a short period
of time before the public requires answers.
CRISPR/Cas-9 techniques in human genome editing will lead to new
tortious actions related to the veiled and enduring ramifications of improper
editing that will make it difficult to assess harm and the statute of limitations
with certainty. Genome editing techniques will inevitably be used in a
clinical setting. Thus, it is prudent that society answers these questions sooner
rather than later and may do so by applying existing tort frameworks to
this context.
Part I of this Comment assesses the application of the loss of chance
doctrine. The loss of chance doctrine appears at first glance as the best fit
for torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9; however, the doctrine is overbroad
when taken beyond the single generation scope. Part II assesses the
application of the fear of harm doctrine. The fear of harm doctrine offers
some insight into how a cause of action may arise from CRISPR/Cas-9
but is limited in its assessment of damages. Part III assesses how the
conventional award may offer an easy application solution. Finally, Part

44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
45. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 303–05 (9th ed., 1998); 1 DAN B. DOBBS,
ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 12–25 (2d ed., 2000).
46. See id. at 21.
47. PATRICK ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 94–95 (1997).
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IV proposes a new type of tort and regulatory hybrid as the best way to
address torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9.
III. THE LOSS OF CHANCE DOCTRINE
A. Overview
Unlike traditional tort law, the loss of chance doctrine is not based
strictly on the “but for” test.48 Traditional tort law asks, “but for” the
defendant’s negligence, would the plaintiff have been injured?49 If the
question is answered in the negative then the test is satisfied, and the
defendant is held liable for the injury. If the question is answered in the
affirmative, the defendant is not held liable.50 Courts often hold that if a
plaintiff can establish that a defendant’s negligence was responsible for
more than half of the injury suffered then the plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages.51 If a plaintiff is only able to establish a lesser responsibility on
the part of the defendant, the plaintiff is not entitled to recovery. Professor
Joseph H. King argues the traditional all or nothing approach both frustrates
and undermines the policy goals of tort law itself.52 Professor King suggests
a better approach would be to fully adopt the loss of chance doctrine, thereby
allowing a plaintiff to recover a proportional amount of damages.53
The loss of chance doctrine is gaining greater recognition in courts around
the world.54 The loss of chance doctrine evaluates damages based on
percentile of likelihood of outcome, rather than an all or nothing approach.
The idea is to award damages “proportion[al] to the increase in the chance
48. Martin Hogg, Re-establishing Orthodoxy in the Realm of Causation, 11(1)
EDINBURGH. L. REV. 8, 14–15 (2007).
49. See Sidaway v. Bethlehem Royal Hospital [1985] A.C. 871 (appeal taken from
Eng. and used to analogize to the issue at hand in this comment).
50. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 116 (5th
ed., 2017).
51. This sentence and the next refer to jurisdictions that participate in partial
comparative fault. In a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiff may recover
any portion of damages to any amount of fault that is attributed to them. For more
information, see Joseph H. King Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
52. See Joseph H. King Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353,
1363–73 (1981).
53. Id. at 1386–88.
54. See, e.g., Tabet v. Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 (Austl.); Hotson v. East Berkshire
Health Authority [1987] AC 750 (Eng.)
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of the adverse outcome.”55 There are two ways that the appropriate percentile
of damages may be reached. First, there is the single outcome approach.
Second, there is the weighted mean approach.56 Part B of this comment
discusses these approaches in greater detail.
Loss of chance goes to the heart of the doctor-patient relationship57
wherein a doctor promises implicitly, through the Hippocratic Oath, to give
the patient the best possible chance of survival.58 Patients place themselves
under a doctor’s care based on the assumption that the doctor will prevent
harm to the patient. It is therefore contrary to the underlying policy of fairness
in tort law to place the party least capable of preventing harm in the position
of bearing the burden of the other party’s negligence. Furthermore, placing
the patient in such a position undermines the larger policy goal of legal
consequences in general: deterrence and compensation.59 If the law is unable
to consistently hold doctors accountable for their negligence so long as
the patient does not die, doctors ultimately face no incentives beyond their
own moral scruples to take all necessary precautions.60 The loss of chance
doctrine holds the physician liable in situations where their negligence led
to a potential harm that may manifest in the future, thereby protecting the
doctor-patient relationship and creating incentives for doctors to be diligent
in their treatment of patients.61
CRISPR/Cas-9 creates a situation where the patient is uniquely vulnerable
to the power of the physician. The imposition of liability based on the loss of
chance doctrine alleviates some of the concerns raised with regard to
CRISPR/Cas-9 torts. By applying this doctrine, physicians are encouraged
to take necessary precautions to overcome scientific gaps in establishing
the causation element necessary for tortious action.62 Those seeking to have
the genomes of their embryos edited might generally be desperate to have

55. Gregg v. Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 (HL) 190 (appeal taken from Eng.).
56. The weighted mean approach is also referred to as “expected value.” Jeremey
Liang Shi Wei & Kee Yang Low, Recognising Lost Chances in Tort Law, 2014 SINGAPORE
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 98, 119 (2014).
57. Loss of chance is most typically found in medical malpractice cases involving
misdiagnosis.
58. This promise is expressed through the words of the Hippocratic oath, which
physicians are required to take: “I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures which
are required. . . .[,]” however, this ‘promise’ is not a guarantee and is perhaps better described
as a goal doctors strive to achieve. Physician Oaths, AAPS, http://aapsonline.org/ethics/
oaths.htm [https://perma.cc/RD9S-X4YZ] (last visited on Sept. 28, 2016).
59. FLEMING, supra note 45, at 5–11.
60. See Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay
for Human Life, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279, 306 (1997).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 313–14, 320–22.
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a genetic child, but are deeply afraid of passing down a genetic illness.63
The patient likely researched all available treatments and determined CRISPR/
Cas-9 as the only viable option for achieving this goal. Thus, the patient
likely has only cursory knowledge of CRISPR/Cas-9 and may not fully
understand the potential repercussions should something go wrong. This
lack of knowledge is not something that would be sufficiently addressed
by informed consent,64 as the doctor is generally the more sophisticated
party, and a patient only knows what it has found through precursory
research. This leaves the patient to rely almost entirely upon the physician.
The physician is the only party capable of preventing harm in this context.
In a CRISPR/Cas-9 setting, it is the physician alone, not the patient, whose
negligence could cause the resulting harm from an improperly edited
genome within an embryo. The patient would not be aware of the harm until
sometime after the birth of their child, in some circumstances perhaps not
even until the birth of their grandchild. As a result, it is imperative that
the physician be provided with sufficient incentive to take every precaution
necessary. This may be easily achieved by imposing liability based on loss
of chance, holding the physician accountable not only for realized injuries,
but for those with a substantial likelihood of realization.65
B. Damages
The proportional awards perpetuated by the loss of chance doctrine
would put the courts in the best position to award damages to plaintiffs
filing CRISPR/Cas-9 related tortious actions. The damages awarded are
capable of integrating the uncertainty presented by the substantial likelihood

63. Joshua Kleinfeld, Tort Law and In Vitro Fertilization: The Need for Legal Recognition
of “Procreative Injury”, 115 YALE L.J. 237 (2005); Tamar Lewin, Sperm Banks Accused
of Losing Samples and Lying About Donors, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/07/22/us/sperm-banks-accused-of-losing-samples-and-lying-about-donors.html?rref=
collection%2Fbyline%2Ftamar-lewin&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&
region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=coll
ection&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S9TK-2YCU].
Author’s Note: Both of the articles above use information related to IVF. However, as
mentioned, CRISPR technology is new, and thus these articles are used to analogize the
issue about CRISPR/Cas-9 this Comment addresses.
64. Sonia M. Suter, The Politics of Information: Informed Consent in Abortion and
End-Of-Life Decision Making, 39 AM. J. L. MED. 7 (2013).
65. See generally Mangan, supra note 60.
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of harm, which may never be realized.66 As mentioned above, there are two
approaches the court may choose to take when estimating loss of chance
damages: the single outcome or the weighted mean approach.
The single outcome approach is simpler, but the damages awarded may
not be accurate. This approach involves estimating when the outcome of
the injury will occur and then multiply that probability by the loss attributed
to the injury.67 Despite the apparent ease of application, the single outcome
approach is insufficient for assessing damages arising from CRISPR/Cas9 tortious actions.68 The harm caused by CRISPR/Cas-9 does not lend itself
to the “when the outcome will come to pass” single outcome calculations
are based on.69 In a majority of CRISPR/Cas-9 cases, there may be more
than one potential outcome.70 Though the single outcome approach may
work if parties became aware of the negligence due to the realization of
the injury, it would be more efficient if courts have a blanket method of
assessing these damages.
The weighted mean approach may offer a better solution in CRISPR/
Cas-9 tort cases. The weighted mean approach considers the likelihood of
multiple potential outcomes and awards damages based on the likelihood
each will occur.71 This approach accounts for the likelihood of all possible
outcomes, rather than just the most probable, assigns a value to each, multiplies
the value by the probability that the outcome will occur, and adds the sums
together.72
Though critics argue this approach is too complicated73 and the statistical
evidence may confuse juries, proponents such as Professor King argue
that such a precise measurement creates a more rational result and prevents
overcompensation, a danger inherent in the more traditional loss of chance
calculations.74 Though the calculations involved may appear daunting, it
raises a concerning reality: a jury is entrusted regularly with the power to
make decisions that will substantially impact a parties’ life (i.e. deciding

66. See Gregg v. Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 (HL) 190 (appeal taken from Eng.). This
concept refers to the idea that there is exists a more-likely-than-not potential for substantial
harm to manifest, but that there remains a chance that the harm may never come to be.
67. Howard Feldman, Chances as Protected Interests: Recovery for the Loss of a
Chance and Increased Risk, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 139, 256 (1987).
68. See King, supra note 52, at 1383 for a detailed hypothetical applying the single
outcome approach.
69. See Feldman, supra note 67, at 67.
70. See Liang, supra note 35.
71. Andrew C. Sand, Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard for Fear
Based Injury in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 113 MICH. L. REV. 711, 733 (2015).
72. Baumann, supra note 33, at 139–43.
73. See Todd. S. Aagaard, Identifying and Valuing the Injury in Lost Chance Cases,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1358, 1359 (1998).
74. See King, supra note 52, at 1384–87; see also Mangan, supra note 60, at 312.
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guilt or innocence, approving punishments like the death penalty, and
deciding general damages through less complicated means), but is not trusted
to conduct math to determine less clear cut damages.75
IV. FEAR OF HARM
A. Overview
The injury arising from fear of harm tort actions is the emotional distress
experienced as a direct result of the defendant’s negligence.76 In the context
of possible future manifestations of disease, emotional distress stems from
anticipation of the disease manifesting and possible medical costs. The
idea that an individual has the right to be free from harm is deeply rooted
within history.77 Fear of harm often arises in toxic tort actions.78 Courts
focus on two elements: “(1) whether a defendant’s conduct has caused the
plaintiff to suffer from a physical consequence; and (2) whether the
plaintiff demonstrates that she is likely to manifest disease in the future.”79
This Comment focuses on these two elements and how they apply to torts
arising from CRISPR/Cas-9. Just as the obstacle posed by latency is prevalent
in toxic torts, it also arises from CRISPR/Cas-9, making the two analogous.80
Traditionally, however, courts were reluctant to accept the concept of
fear of harm, or the fear of future harm, due to judicial economy concerns.81
To combat this concern, courts developed the physical injury rule. This

75. The jury can be given instructions on how to use the formula and the judge can
double-check their calculations.
76. See Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing, 81
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1555, 1588–89 (2016).
77. See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988) (pointing to the establishment of English tort law recognizing
claims for hurt feelings). See also Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed
Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or A Pandora’s Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 528
(1984) (asserting that fear of harm has roots in 13th century assault actions).
78. Toxic tort actions involve a plaintiff who has been exposed to a toxic chemical
agent that may result in a physical injury. See Andrew R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced
Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1188, n.77 (1999).
79. See Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle of Future Cases in Tort,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 970 (2002).
80. See Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 507 N.E.2d 476, 480–81 (1987)
(holding that latency is not an obstacle to recovery under this theory so long as there is
reasonable apprehension connecting the future possible harm to the injury wherein the
injury has manifested as mental distress).
81. See Plummer v. Abbott Lab., 568 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D.R.I. 1983).

419

LOVELL (DO NOT DELETE)

6/12/2018 8:51 AM

physical injury rule permits recovery for a physical injury so long as the
injury is a directly and causally related to the tortious conduct.82
Current law requires a plaintiff show causation by an injury via the
physical injury rule;83 however, the way a plaintiff may show that injury
varies.84 Generally, courts rely on medical evidence to show the substantial
likelihood that an injury will manifest.85 Medical evidence shows that the
defendant was in fact the person who placed the plaintiff within the “zone
of danger.”86 This may pose a problem for the first generations of negligence
claims arising from CRISPR/Cas-9, as the uncertainty of the injury, and
our general lack of knowledge of how it will manifest, will result in
conjecture from medical professionals.87 The challenge may be partially
overcome by utilizing the fear of harm approach taken by the Sixth Circuit
in Sterling v. Velsicol, which requires the plaintiff only establish a reasonable
causal connection between the emotional distress and the possibility of the
injury manifesting in the future.88 The lower causal connection standard
presented by the court in this case would foreseeably allow current knowledge
of the genome to suffice. Doctors and researchers currently have enough
knowledge to say with reasonable certainty that negligent improper editing
of the genome will lead to the potential manifestation of the disease or
illness in the future.89
Fear of harm may be viable to address torts arising from CRISPR/Cas9 under the Sterling standard; however, such an approach would only work
to satisfy current generational injuries, leaving unanswered and un-addressable
the potential injury to future generations. It is unacceptable for the current
generation to trade potential harm to future generations in order to presently

82. See Klein, supra note 79, at 975.
83. Scholars argue that courts should look beyond these two elements and allow
recovery wherever it is reasonably established that the injury may arise in the future due
to the negligent actions of the defendant. Although these arguments warrant a closer look
this is not the current state of the law and the question of whether a modified fear of harm
doctrine would better fit torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9 is beyond the scope of this
comment. See Debbie E. Lanin, The Fear of Disease as a Compensable Injury: An Analysis of
Claims Based on AIDS Phobia, 67 ST. JOHN L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2012).
84. See Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 381 S.E.2d 295, 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the injury must be proved by medical certainty); Kazatsky v. King David Mem’l
Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 996 (1987) (holding that the level of emotional injury must be
outrageous).
85. Bayefsky, supra note 76, at 1590.
86. The “zone of danger” comes from the doctrine of proximate cause and refers to
the area of harm the plaintiff may have been placed into by the defendant. See John J.
Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV.
789, 815–17, 883–905 (2007).
87. See generally Baumann, supra note 33.
88. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196–98 (6th Cir. 1988).
89. Moser, supra note 8; Li et al., supra note 14; Niu Y. et al., supra note 42.
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secure a cause of action for themselves. Such an approach would leave
numerous potential plaintiffs with a viable means to recover and would
allow physicians to sidestep liability so long as their negligence does not
manifest in the current generation, thereby undermining the doctor-patient
relationship.90 However, by the very nature of CRISPR/Cas-9, some
injuries will not be realized until the next generation.91 Revisiting the
hemophilia hypothetical above, when applying the Sterling standard, the
physician would not be liable to any potential sons. This is a result that hardly
seems fair in the multi-generational context. However, it may be the price
that must be paid for securing compensation in the single or current
generational context.
B. Damages
Difficulty in calculating damages under the fear of harm doctrine exists
as there is no objective standard on which courts may rely.92 The jury is
given broad discretion on what damages to award93 and is often provided
with vague and unenlightening instructions.94 As a result, juries have returned
with greatly differing damage awards amongst seemingly identical cases.95
The unpredictability of these awards undermines both the deterrence and
the fairness goals of tort law. With such a wide variance in awards,
physicians may choose to take their chances with the jury and assume that
the differing awards will balance over time.96 Rather than being deterred
from the tortious conduct, physician may elect to pay higher insurance
90. Eley, supra note 40.
91. Baumann, supra note 33, at 149.
92. Richard H. Spector, Pain and Suffering: Current Concepts, 34 MED. TRIAL TECH.
Q. 202, 203 (1987).
93. See Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 2006 Jury Instr. Lexis 2473; Blue v. Bronson
& Migliaccio, 2011 Jury Instr. Lexis 82.
94. Florida Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil, Damages § 404.12 (2015)
95. Douglas L. Price, Hedonic Damages: To Value a Life or Not to Value a Life?,
95 W. VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065–75 (1993). Hedonic damages are those associated with loss
of enjoyment of life cases. Id.at 1055. When it comes to personal injury cases, multiple
monetary arguments are made in support for a certain return of damages, including opinion
evidence and per diem arguments. Id. at 1067, 1072. As every living individual is different
in day to day life, counsel can make arguments on all activities undertaken at home, work,
or elsewhere and those cause the damages to fluxuate. Id. at 1066.
96. If one case results in a high damages award while another results in minimal
damages, the two will even out to two moderate payouts from the plaintiff. One award of
$200,000 and a second award of $20,000 has the same consequences for the physician as
two awards of $110,000, well within most physician’s insurance coverage.
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premiums and risk potential litigation.97 Additionally, the fact that two
seemingly identical cases can result in grossly different damage awards
insults the notion of fairness, replacing it instead with a system that fails
to award appropriate consistent damages.
In an attempt to address the issue of awarding damages in a fear of harm
case, different courts have adopted different approaches. Though no agreement
has been reached as to which approach is the best, two predominant
approaches have emerged.98 First, some courts use the per diem method
of calculating damages whereby a jury assigns a monetary value to how
much the plaintiff suffers as a result of the injury, estimates how many
days the plaintiff is likely to suffer the injury, and then multiplies the perday monetary value by the number of days.99 But despite giving some
guidance on how to calculate the damages, the per diem approach does not
address the issues surrounding jury guidance and leaves the daily award
entirely to the jury’s discretion. Much like the traditional application for
damages under the fear of harm doctrine, uniformity is once again at issue.
Second, some courts use the willingness to pay method of calculating
damages, whereby a jury calculates the loss of enjoyment in one’s life100
by determining how much one would be willing to pay to be without the
injury.101 There are two primary problems with this approach: loss of pleasure
is only one aspect of the injured party’s suffering, and using loss of pleasure
as a basis provides only the average cost of the injury, ignoring the aspects
that may be subjectively unique to the injured party currently before the
court.102
Neither the per diem nor the willingness to pay approach are capable of
sufficiently calculating damages for torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9. Both
approaches lack precision and leave too much to the jury’s subjective
determinations, which may result in unfair awards. There remain insufficient
safeguards to ward against such results, as courts cannot overturn the award
unless it is egregious enough to shock the conscience.103

97. Anupam B. Jena, Seth Seabury, Darius Lakdawalla, Amitabh Chandra, Malpractice
Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 N. ENG. J. MED. 629, 635 (2011); American
Society of Clinical Oncology, Malpractice Insurance: What You Need to Know, 3 J. ONCOL.
PRACT. 247, 274–77 (2007).
98. James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Per Diem or Similar Mathematical Basis for
Fixing Damages for Pain and Suffering, 3 A.L.R. 4th 940 (1981).
99. Id. at 945.
100. Such damages are often referred to as “hedonic damages.” See Price, supra note 95,
at 1055–60.
101. Tina M. Tabbachi, Hedonic Damages: A New Trend in Compensation?, 52 OHIO
ST. L. J. 331, 331, 341–42 (1991).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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V. THE CONVENTIONAL AWARD
Though only recently introduced as a concept by the House of Lords,104
the conventional award may serve as a fallback for assessing injury and
awarding damages in torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9. In general, courts
are consistently reluctant to view the birth of a child as negative, regardless
of the child’s health.105 The conventional award acknowledges the additional
costs associated with raising a disabled child, sidestepping the issue of
determining whether the actual birth of the disabled child is considered a
negative life event.106 Rather than placing a number on a day’s value, or
calculating a subjective loss of enjoyment, the court sets a particular sum
that plaintiffs are entitled to recover107 when suing for a particular injury.
Such an approach, however, fails to consider the breadth of injuries that
could result from CRISPR/Cas-9. On an instinctive level, not all disabilities
are created equal; some are more debilitating than others.108 The policy
of fairness, which drives tort law, is severally undermined by awarding the
same monetary damages to all disabilities.109 As applied to CRISPR-Cas9 torts, the conventional award would fail to take into consideration the
potential long-term ramifications of an improperly edited genome, touching
merely on this generation rather than considering the next.
Furthermore, the admittedly paltry sum of the conventional award is unlikely
to ensure that physicians take all steps necessary to protect their patient.
Not only does the conventional award fail to preserve the sanctity of the
doctor-patient relationship, but it fails to promote the goal of deterrence,
which is inherit to tort law.110 Physicians already carry insurance policies
due to the risk of medical malpractice and other negligence suits that accompany
any practicing physician. The paltry sum from a CRISPR/Cas-9 case that
104. Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital N.H.S. Trust [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 88;
R v. A [2002] 2 All E.R. 177 (C.A.) (Eng.).
105. See McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 A.C. 59 (Eng.).
106. Nicolette M. Priaulx, A Letter From the U.K.: Tort Law and Damages for the
Unwanted Child, 14 J. OF LEGAL ECON. 53–79 (2008).
107. See generally Rees v. Memorial Hospital [2003] UKHL 52 (holding that the
conventional award would be set at fifteen thousand pounds, the idea being to set the award
so as not to be minimal but also not to be too high).
108. Compare the effects of Hunter’s Syndrome discussed in the initial hypothetical,
which severally limits a person’s life, with the effects of hemophilia which may not affect
the current generation, but which may affect the next generation, but whose effects are
arguably less debilitating to a person’s life than Hunter’s Syndrome.
109. DOBBS, supra note 45.
110. De Rycke, supra note 43.
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applies the conventional award approach will hardly raise their rates, nor
will it require the physician to pay out of pocket for any portion of the
settlement.111 Thus, the conventional award would serve more as a mere
annoyance to physicians than the liability of higher awards would.
Whereas the conventional award leaves unanswered a multitude of
problems with torts arising CRISPR/Cas-9, it has the singular advantage
of being uniform both in the award of damages and the application. A
fund could be created where those injured by improper genome editing
may recover a set amount, regardless of the severity of the injury. This
would entitle injured parties to some recovery while side stepping ethical
concerns. Such ease of use may be more appealing to courts than the nuances
of either the loss of chance doctrine or the fear of harm doctrine.
VI. A NEW KIND OF TORT
Each of the existing frameworks discussed above has the potential to
address torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9, but each is flawed in some
respect. The loss of chance doctrine furthers tort goals,112 can be utilized
fairly,113 and provides a way to calculate damages.114 However, the loss
of chance doctrine risks over-deterrence by requiring physicians to pay
large sums to future generations effected by improper gene editing that
fails to manifest in the first generation.115 One solution is to only allow
recovery for first generation injuries, but this is unfair to future generations
who experience very real injuries as a direct result of the physician’s
negligence.
The fear of harm doctrine allows for ease of recovery by focusing on an
emotional rather than physical harm,116 but it fails to provide a viable way
to calculate damages117 and risks undermining tort goals.118 In response,

111. See Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 381 S.E.2d 295, 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the injury must be proved by medical certainty.); Kazatsky v. King David
Mem’l Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 995 (1987) (holding that the level of emotional injury
must be tremendous).
112. FLEMING, supra note 45.
113. Feldman, supra note 67.
114. Joseph H. King Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting
of the Loss-of-A-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 504 (1998). See also discussion
Part I.B.
115. The risk of over-deterrence manifests itself in the multi-generational context
wherein a physician would be liable for potentially large damage awards for an insurmountable
amount of time.
116. Bayefsky, supra note 76, at 1565, 1586.
117. Spector, supra note 92, at 223.
118. DOBBS, supra note 45, at 12.
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the legislature may enact laws prescribing the proper way to calculate
damages, but legislation is unlikely to be uniform in character and application.
Finally, the conventional award is easy to use and can be applied
uniformly,119 but fails to both deter negligent conduct and to provide fair
awards to injured parties.120 One may increase the award amount, but this
would have an unfair effect in multi-generational awards and result in
over-deterrence.
Given these difficulties, it is prudent to create a new tort structure to
address torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9 and to root this new tort in existing
tort law. This tort should focus on furthering the tort goals of deterrence
and fairness while addressing the intricacies presented by CRISPR/Cas-9,
such as the distinction between single and multi-generational injuries.
With these considerations in mind, this Comment proposes a system that
borrows heavily from the loss of chance doctrine for single generational injuries
and combines the conventional award with governmental regulation for
multi-generational injuries.
A. Single Generation Injuries
Single generation injuries present less complexities than multi-generational
injuries in a few respects: the plaintiff is alive,121 the injury is more easily
discernable, and the evidence is relatively fresh. As such, single generation
injuries are more easily addressed by traditional tort frameworks, such as
the fear of harm doctrine and the loss of chance doctrine. Though the fear
of harm doctrine can be utilized for torts arising from CRISPR/Cas-9, it
is the less desirable of the two doctrines. Despite its ease of applicability,
the challenges posed by the calculation of damages for fear of harm would
complicate any litigation rooted in this framework and would require either a
great deal of regulatory intervention122 or the intervention of the Supreme
Court.123 In the doctrine’s current state, it risks undermining tort policy

119. Spector, supra note 92.
120. De Rycke, supra note 43.
121. This comment does not specify who the plaintiff is, it may be necessary in the
future to be more specific about this but at such an early stage it seems superfluous.
122. Federal law would have to be enacted which would preempt state law and which
would have to mandate the precise handling of such cases, such an approach would likely
run into heavy state opposition and may stand directly contrary to constitutional guidelines.
123. A Supreme Court decision which set forth the standard for calculating damages
in such cases could create the legal unification the approach currently lacks; however, there
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goals,124 which would be an undesirable result in any tort. In particular,
as the CRISPR/Cas-9 technique is already likely to face a great deal of
uncertainty within a medical context,125 it would substantially undermine
the torts credibility should it fail to further the policy goals of tort law
generally.126 There would simply be too much uncertainty in one tort.
Luckily, the loss of chance doctrine lacks the shortcomings of the fear
of harm doctrine and creates a viable option to address single generation
injuries arising from CRISPR/Cas-9 techniques. The loss of chance doctrine
aims to further tort goals by creating a fair result, provides sound guidelines
on how to apply the doctrine, and provides a viable way of calculating damages
in the most accurate fashion available: through the weighted means approach.127
The doctrine’s greatest failure is the likelihood of over-deterrence should
it be applied in to multi-generational injuries arising from CRISPR/Cas-9.128
This failure can be sidestepped by applying the doctrine solely to single
generation injuries. By limiting loss of chance recovery to single generation
injuries in this context, the medical uncertainties of the first generation
can be accounted for while acknowledging that harm to future generations
may never arise or may be so attenuated from the negligent editing as to
not warrant recovery.
B. Multi-Generational Injuries
The inherent risk in CRISPR/Cas-9 gene editing is that any negligence
on the part of the physician can affect future generations.129 On the one
hand, it is important that any tort claim proposed to address CRISPR/Cas9 injuries account for the damage potential for multi-generational injuries,
otherwise the very real injuries of future generations may be invalidated.
On the other hand, it is unfair to hold physicians or their practices liable
for later generations under a traditional tort approach because resulting
damages would seemingly have no end. Physicians would end up facing
complex litigation and paying large damage awards for their entire lives to
injured parties.130 Further, physicians would be deterred from practicing
in a field where they face such liability. Balancing the concerns of compensating
would likely be many years in which no unifying principles arose and the Supreme Court
could ultimately choose not to decide the issue-as is currently the case.
124. See Part III.
125. Reis, supra note 37.
126. FLEMING, supra note 45.
127. King, supra note 52.
128. See Part I.B.
129. See Niu Y. et al., supra note 42, at 836 (“But whether [CRISPR] is feasible for
primates is unclear.”). Currently, scientists are modifying genes in monkeys as monkeys
serve as a close comparison to modeling human diseases. Id.
130. Feldman, supra note 67.
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injured parties without over-deterring physicians from practicing in this
area will take some finesse.
In order to traverse such a fine line, legislators should model damages
after conventional award principles.131 Legislators should create and manage
an award fund, draft regulations making participation mandatory, and make
this the only option for multi-generational injury recovery. Physicians
who practice genome editing would be required to annually pay a certain
percentage of their taxable profits into the fund. Multi-generational injured
parties who are able to trace their injury directly to a physician’s negligence
would then be able to recover a certain amount from the fund. The injured
party’s recovery would be based on the severity of the injury suffered as
not all injuries are equally serious. The amount of damages awarded would
be calculated in a manner similar to social security disability benefits; however,
unlike social security disability benefits, recovery would be a one time, tax
free, payout.
Physicians should not be able to circumvent this payout to multigenerational injured parties through limiting their liability for negligent
misconduct by having patients sign a medical waiver. The public interests
that override medical waivers in medical malpractice are also prevalent
within the CRISPR/Cas-9 context.132 There is unequal bargaining power
between the physician and the patient, because the physician is in a more
sophisticated and superior position to determine what is the best treatment
for the patient.133 Furthermore, a vast informational discrepancy exists
between the physician and the patient, as the physician more fully understands
exactly what the patient is agreeing to. This is particularly true in the
context of CRISPR/Cas-9, as the physician has had extensive training and
education in genetics. It would be unreasonable to expect a patient to have
the same or similar basis of knowledge about the procedure. Rather than
focusing exclusively upon the medical emergency situation, courts have
instead focused their reasoning on the public policy interests and the
discrepancy of bargaining power within that context. Courts should strike

131. Kircher, supra note 86, at 341–42, 348–49.
132. See Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431–32 (Tenn. 1977); Cudnik v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891, 894–96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
133. Laura Nimmon, Terese Stenfors-Hayes, The “Handling” of power in the physicianpatient encounter: perceptions from experienced physicians, 16 BMC MED. EDUC. 1, 1–9
(2016). This article shows that a significant number of experienced physicians acknowledge a
power discrepancy between the physician and the patient that places the physician in
a position of power.
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down medical waivers within the context of torts arising from CRISPR/
Cas-9 in order to protect the public’s interest in deterring physicians’
negligence and in compensating injured parties.134
A conventional award payout system would not be unduly burdensome
to physicians and would still provide sufficient deterrence. In fact, should
CRISPR/Cas-9 follow in the footsteps of IVF treatment, as it is currently
poised to do,135 the field should be lucrative for physicians. The tradeoff
to practicing in such a lucrative, yet experimental field would be to remain
liable under the loss of chance doctrine for single generation injuries while
simultaneously paying into the conventional award fund for multi-generational
injuries. Legislatures may even be able to draft regulations in such a way
as to add the fund payments into already existing medical malpractice premiums.
While this approach may seem harsh, no physicians are currently actively
using CRISPR/Cas-9 in a clinical setting. Therefore, physicians entering
the field would be aware of the cost of practicing in this particular field.
Those physicians who feel indignant at the prospect of paying up, when they
themselves may never negligently edit genes, are invited to practice in
different areas of medicine.
The burden on physicians may be further lessened by the imposition of
a statute of limitations upon multi-generational recovery from the fund.
Statute of limitations periods vary widely depending on the type of tort at
issue. Within the context of medical malpractice,136 there are three primary
approaches. First, there is the termination rule, otherwise known as the
continuous treatment rule.137 Under this rule, the statute of limitations begins
to toll when the physician-patient relationship is terminated.138 Second,
there is the discovery rule where the statute of limitations begins to toll when
the patient discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable care, should have
discovered, the injury.139 Third, there is the general rule where the statute
of limitations begins to toll starting on the date the injury occurred.140 In

134. See Tunkl v. Regents of University of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 443–47 (Cal. 1963).
135. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF CHILD HEALTH, supra note 6.
136. Medical malpractice statute of limitations appear more analogous to the CRISPR/
Cas-9 context than pure personal injury suits such as those arising from a car accident,
because in the CRISPR/Cas-9 context medical assistance was sought and the application
of the medical assistance has resulted in injury.
137. See Dana David Peck, The Continuous Treatment Doctrine: A Toll on the Statute of
Limitations for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49 ALB. L. REV. 64, 65 (1984).
138. Bowers v. Santee, 124 N.E. 238, 240 (Ohio 1919) (setting forth the underlying
rationale for the termination rule). This case has been overruled by Oliver v. Kaiser
Community Health.
139. See O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 447 N.E.2d 727, 729–31 (Ohio 1983).
140. Vivian S. Chu, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41661, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
REFORM: LEGAL ISSUES AND 50-STATE SURVEYS ON TORT REFORM PROPOSALS 11 (2011).
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all three instances, the statute of limitations, once tolled, gives an injured
party an average of two to three years to file suit.141
Two to three years is an inadequate timeframe for multi-generational injuries
arising from CRISPR/Cas-9 because the injury many not be discovered
until well after the filing date has passed. Therefore, none of the three
primary statute of limitation approaches in medical malpractice work.
However, when tweaked, the termination rule offers a potential framework
to lessen the burden on physicians. Although the way the traditional termination
rule is laid out focuses on the literal end of the physician-patient relationship,142
the underlying rationale focuses on the finality of the physician being able
to take curative efforts.143 So long as a physician is practicing, they have
the opportunity to take curative efforts; either efforts to remedy the initial
problem that made treatment necessary, or to fix the problems arising from
their own negligent actions.144
It is this rationale that supports a proposed tweak to the termination rule.
Rather than allow the physician to remain liable for two to three years
after the conclusion of their relationship with the patient, the physician shall
remain liable until the time they would be no longer be able to take any curative
efforts, or at a minimum, until the termination of their practice. Under this
approach, within the CRISPR/Cas-9 context, the physician would be liable
so long as they at one time practiced genome editing.
The concept of liability is also tweaked in the sense that the physician
does not remain individually liable to each patient they have personally
undertaken, rather they are liable to the umbrella group of CRISPR/Cas-9
patients as are covered by the conventional award fund. This would hold
the physician liable to contribute to the fund only for so long as they
practice genome editing. Such an approach would prevent overburdening
the physician because they would be required to make payments to the fund
only for the length of time that they themselves are profiting from CRISPR/
Cas-9. Though this is an unheard-of length of time for the statute of limitations
for medical malpractice,145 the conventional award does not amount to a
lawsuit and should therefore be afforded a different standard when it comes
to time limitations. Furthermore, without a broad statute of limitations for
the mandatory payments to the fund, physicians would be liable for these
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Peck, supra note 137.
Bowers, 124 N.E. at 239.
Id.
See Chu, supra note 140, at 11–12.
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payments for an indefinite period of time. Should the physician change
the area of medicine they wish to practice or should the physician retire,
they would risk continuing liability for fund payments. Such an approach
would likely over-deter146 physicians and prevent them from entering the
field and practicing CRISPR/Cas-9. By limiting the physician liability to
a specified timeframe defined by their own profits within the field, the goals
of tort law147 are allowed to flourish without stifling the medical community.
Under this approach, those who suffer from multi-generational injuries
make a sacrifice arguably equal to that which the physicians must make.
In order to allow the injured party to recover for a longer period after the
physician breached their duty, the damages available are paltry in comparison
to those available under the loss of chance. This approach is not meant to
invalidate the injury, on the contrary, allowing recovery so long after the
fact is meant to validate the injured party’s suffering. It is meant to recognize
the injury as an actual harm suffered while simultaneously allowing fair
treatment of the physician. As stated above, it would simply be unfair to
hold a physician liable for their life time and for large damages. The tradeoff
between these two goals, fairness to both the injured party and the physician,
is the limitation on damages. The damages would be calculated based on
those currently used for social security disability benefits.148 This approach
allows regulators to consider the wide variety of resulting injuries, their
severity, the harm suffered by the injured party, and how much of an impact
the injury is likely to have on the injured party’s life. These awards would
be larger than those given for social security disability benefits149 and would
more closely mirror the conventional award, because, unlike social security
disability benefits, this payout would occur only once. Similar to other
personal injury recovery, the award would be tax free.150 However, this
proposal does not provide further guidance as to the award distribution,
leaving the determination to the discretion of the legislators.151

146. See FLEMING, supra note 45, at 10.
147. Id. at 8–9.
148. See generally WAYNE LOU & JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
32552, SOCIAL SECURITY: CALCULATION AND HISTORY OF TAXING BENEFITS 1–9 (2016)
(explaining the calculation of social security disability benefits).
149. Spector, supra note 92.
150. 26 U.S.C. § 104 (2015).
151. Regulators would need to decide the actual monetary amounts to be awarded along
with the coinciding percentage rates of qualifying injury for each award. Additionally,
regulators would need to establish exactly where the limitations for multi-generational
recovery should be—whether those experiencing third, fourth, fifth, etc. injuries should be
able to recover from the fund or whether there is a cutoff.
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VII. APPLICATION
With this new single and multi-generational tort framework in mind,
this section returns to the three introductory hypotheticals. Each of these
hypotheticals demonstrates a potential injury arising from the use of
CRISPR/Cas-9. The first hypothetical is a fairly straight forward single
generation injury, the second hypothetical is a more complex single generation
injury, and the third hypothetical is a multi-generational injury. These
hypotheticals consider application of the weighted means approach to the
loss of chance and the multi-generational framework. The goal of these
hypotheticals is to demonstrate the straight forward application of the
proposed tort system.
This section first considers the Hunter’s Syndrome hypothetical and modifies
it slightly in order to demonstrate a potential, though not currently manifested,
injury. In this version, despite having gone through the gene editing process
you decide to have your child genetically tested for Hunter’s Syndrome after
birth.152 The results show that your child does have the enzyme deficiency
that causes Hunter’s Syndrome but the tests are not sophisticated enough to
tell you whether your child has an attenuated or severe form of the syndrome.153
Assume that as a result of the improper gene editing there is a 50% chance
of the syndrome manifesting at late childhood, 20% chance at age four, 10%
chance at age three, 5% chance at age two, and 15% chance that the syndrome
never manifests.154 Now assume that if the syndrome manifests in late
childhood the loss would be $200,000; $300,000 at age four; $350,000 at
152. The Hunter’s Syndrome test costs approximately $200. It can be used to confirm a
suspected case of Hunter’s Syndrome, but since the syndrome is rare the test is not typically
implemented without cause. See e.g., GREENWOOD GENETIC CENTER, http://www.ggc.org/
diagnostic/tests-costs/test-finder/hunter-syndrome—enzyme-analysis.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2018) [https://perma.cc/A2Z4-9HZS].
153. See Barbara K. Burton & Roberto Giugliani, Diagnosing Hunter syndrome in
pediatric practice: practical considerations and common pitfalls, 171 EUR. J. PEDIATR. 631,
636–37 (2012) (explaining how Hunter’s Syndrome comes in two forms: attenuated and
severe. Symptoms for the severe version begin manifesting around two to four years of
age while symptoms for the attenuated version begin manifesting in late childhood. Though
both suffer from debilitating somatic symptoms, those with the severe version also experience
severe cognitive impairments. Additionally, though both are associated with early death,
those with the severe version typically die before adulthood whereas those with the attenuated
version can live into early adulthood. See Barbara K. Burton & Roberto Giugliani, Diagnosing
Hunter Syndrome in Pediatric Practice: Practical Considerations and Common Pitfalls,
171 EUR J. PEDIATR. 631, 635–39 (2012).
154. King, supra note 52, at 1384 (showing that the above calculations are based off
of Professor King’s calculations for the weighted means approach).
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age three; and $400,000 at age two. To determine the total value of the chance
of injury, the potential loss figures must be added together—$100,000 (50%
of $200,000), $60,000 (20% of $300,000), $35,000 (10% of $350,000),
$20,000 (5% of $400,000), and $0 (15% of $0)155—resulting in a sum of
$215,000.156
Now, consider the DMD hypothetical in order to more fully explore how
the weighted means approach to loss of chance addresses injuries arising
from CRISPR/Cas-9. In the DMD hypothetical, the middle son (“MS”)
already has a tangible injury to be accounted for—he is wheelchair bound,
which cannot be reversed—but the full extent of his possible injuries has
not yet been realized. The doctor who negligently performed the procedure
cannot tell whether or not he can stop the progress of the mutation or whether
it will ultimately kill MS. Furthermore, there is a possibility, given the
improper edit performed on MS, that either the youngest son (“YS”) or the
eldest son (“ES”) will experience the same problem as MS. However, at this
time this injury is purely speculative.
First, in regard to MS, assume the improper CRISPR/Cas-9 editing that
caused the injury already suffered by MS is worth $200,000 and there is
a 25% chance of further loss of movement (arms, torso, etc.), a 10%
chance of having to be on a ventilator, a 20% chance of death, and a 45%
chance that the doctor will be able to stop the progress. Now assume that
if there was further loss of movement the loss would be $100,000; if a
ventilator is required the loss would be $300,000; if death resulted the loss
would be $1,000,000; and if the doctor is able to stop the progress the loss
would be $0. To find the total value of the chance of injury, the potential
loss figures must be added together—$25,000 (25% of $100,000), $30,000
(10% of $300,000), $200,000 (20% of $1,000,000) and $0 (45% of $0)—
resulting in a sum of $255,000. Additionally, the worth of the existing injury
must be added, which results in a total of $455,000.
Second, in regard to YS and ES, neither YS nor ES have a tangible injury,
but they will always be worried about the potential for injury due to the
mistake the doctor made with MS. Assume that as a result of the improper
CRISPR/Cas-9 editing that has manifested in MS, there is a 15% chance that
YS and ES face loss of movement (arms, legs, torso, etc.), 5% chance of having
to be on a ventilator, 3% chance of death, and 77% chance that the injury will
never manifest. Now assume that if there was loss of movement the loss

155. Although the percentages are derived from Kin’s weighted means approach, the
actual monetary figures used in this paragraph have been arbitrarily made up by the Author
for the purposes of providing an illustration to the calculations of damages.
156. It is important to keep in mind that in all of our single generational injury
hypotheticals it is up to the jury to decide whether the injured party is entitled to recover
this sum, or a portion of this sum.
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would be $150,000 (the mid-point between MS’ realized loss of movement
and potential further loss of movement); if a ventilator was required, the
loss would be $300,000; if death resulted, the loss would be $1,000,000;
and if the injury never manifested, the loss would be $0. To find the total value
of the chance of injury, the loss figures are added together—$22,500 (15%
of $150,000), $15,000 (5% of $300,000), $30,000 (3% of $1,000,000) and
$0 (77% of $0)—resulting in a sum of $67,500 per sibling.
Finally, consider the hemophilia hypothetical and apply the multi-generational
framework. In the hemophilia hypothetical, the improper genome editing
occurred in a generation prior to the actual manifestation of the injury. The
grandparents of the injured party paid for genome editing in the mother of
the injured party, the genome editing was improperly performed, but because
the mother was only a carrier she personally suffered no injury from the
negligence. However, when the mother gave birth to a son the injury from
the improper genome editing manifested. In this case, not only did the injury
occur thirty to forty years from the date of the negligent conduct, but the
doctor who improperly performed the genome editing is no longer alive.
Though the parties involved are likely to believe they are entitled to a
larger damage award than that of single generation injuries, it undermines
the notion of fairness to allow this type of recovery.
The injured party still has the right to recover from the conventional award
despite the length of time that has lapsed between the conduct and injury.
In order to obtain an award, the parents, acting as agents of the child,157 would
file the appropriate paperwork with the agency or board supervising the
conventional award. The agency or board would then assess the severity of
the injury in order to determine the proper amount of recovery. In this
hypothetical, the factors the agency or board would likely want to consider
would include: the level of severity of the form of hemophilia, whether
doctors foresee the need for ongoing treatment, whether doctors foresee
the need for ongoing treatment and how invasive the treatment would be,
the effect on quality of life, and whether the injury is likely to result in
premature death. The agency or board would then compare the severity of
the injury to other injuries arising from CRISPR/Cas-9 and calculate the
appropriate amount of recovery based on the totality of these contributing

157. If the multi-generational injury did not become known until the injured party
was an adult, then the adult may file for conventional award recovery on their own.
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factors. A one-time payment would then be issued to the injured party,
which in this hypothetical is the son.158
The proposed tort system is easy to apply as it is already rooted in the
current tort system and the gross results optimize fairness while minimizing
deterrence. Single generation awards require some calculations, but juries
are regularly relied upon to calculate the value of injuries with less guidance.
Although the multi-generation awards require the establishment of a
conventional award fund and a governing body to disperse rewards, this
allows an injured party to recover damages when no other legal recourse is
available to them. Thus, the system is designed to be the least burdensome
on physicians while protecting their patients.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Modern day scientists and researchers are poised on the precipice of
making genome editing clinically available. Once the technology is viable it
will expand rapidly, much like IVF did, and will initially have little longitudinal
data to help guide physicians. As a result, injuries will arise from improper
genome editing. Currently our tort system is ill prepared to address these
grievances. The novelty of the injuries that will arise require a system that
is able to balance the interests of physicians with single and multi-generational
plaintiffs, while providing a realistic framework for courts to follow. This
comment offers a brand-new context that accounts for these needs and sets
expectations for how to handle these injuries in the right way, promulgating
the goals of tort law. This approach combines elements of traditional tort
law with a proposed governmental regulation that will help compensate
victims while not over-deterring physicians to practice in the field of genome
editing. By basing this approach on existing doctrine, it should lead to an
easier transition for courts and claimants alike.
If society does not preempt the technology with a carefully thought out
tort system, the legal framework addressing CRISPR/Cas-9 injuries will
become a mix of existing law. Attorneys will have a difficult time trying
to wade through the resulting legal miasma and the law will be even more
difficult for courts to apply. Therefore, it is important to establish expectations
regarding how to handle these injuries now because once the technology
is viable, expectations will quickly be set by whatever systems are in place.
These expectations will entrench themselves into the legal system and will
be difficult to uproot. If society sets the expectations properly on the ground

158. Only the injured party is entitled to recover in the context of multi-generational
injuries arising from CRISPR/Cas-9; the grandparents and mother will be unable to recover any
damages.
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level before people have adjusted to working within a particular system,
society can avoid inconsistencies and failures within our legal system.
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